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 Introduction 
In our experiment, we have a multiple-round public goods game but with a probabilistic 
endpoint. This changes the Nash equilibrium, such that cooperation is the new equilibrium 
strategy. The experiment consists of two treatments, one with a single round per session (called 
the intertemporal treatment), and the second with multiple rounds per session. Experimental 
results suggest that contribution was indeed positive and consistent provided a high enough 
probability of the game’s continuation, but declined when probability fell.   
 Game theory suggests that players in public goods games will not cooperate under 
conditions when the endpoint is known. Rational agents do not assume other players would 
cooperate or otherwise reduce their payoffs to the benefit of other agents. This is most evident in 
typical prisoner dilemma games, as well as in applied prisoner dilemma games, such as public 
goods experiment, and the appropriately named “trust” games. Theory and experimentation have 
both indicated that under most circumstances, individuals are incentivized to cheat in public 
goods and prisoner dilemma games. The paradox, then, is that individualized incentives create 
lower collective payoffs. 
The public goods game exemplifies the economic phenomena concerning cooperation 
and trust. Policy issues and social sciences concerning voluntary contribution, coordination, and 
cooperation are expressed as a fundamental public goods problem. Such problems are concerned 
with determining which conditions people cooperate and which institutions and environmental 
factors foster cooperation.  
One example of public goods implications is the failure of motorists to voluntarily reduce 
their own carbon emissions. If every motorist did reduce the amount of gasoline they used, either 
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by carpooling or by purchasing more fuel efficient cars, carbon emissions will decrease. But the 
individual motorist’s costs would be higher than if that motorist were to do nothing and let 
everyone else change their behaviors to improve the environment. This is the “free rider 
problem,” in which benefits are received collectively but the costs dispersed to each individual.  
Most public goods games, however, have experimental settings that are disanalagous 
with this and other examples of real life public goods problems. One of the most significant 
differences is that every player knows the point at which the game ends in most experiments.  
Game theory, the study of strategic rational behavior, offers some theoretical insight into why the 
public goods problem occurs under these conditions. In a one-shot public goods game, each 
player ought to not cooperate, according to theoretical predictions. The reason for this is that a 
decision maker would maximize his earnings in this way, given the theoretical expectations of 
the other players. This reasoning, whereby a strategic decision maker takes into account the 
decisions of other players leads to the group of individuals to reach what is known as a “Nash 
Equilibrium.”  
Even in a multiple-round public goods game, theory does not change. To demonstrate 
this conclusion, Game theorists engage in “backward induction,” where the Nash Equilibrium of 
the last round is determined first. In the last round, equilibrium is the same as the one-shot game, 
since no future losses due to defection are incurred. The equilibrium of the second-to-last round 
is then determined, and again, because no future losses are forgone, the dominant strategy is to 
not cooperate. Every round up to the first, then, carries the same strategy. 
Such public good games with a known endpoint are common, but represent a departure 
from real world instances of public goods problems. Hence, the public goods games with this 
kind of boundary condition provide are limited in its insight to real-world application.  
Carlen 5 
 
Most public goods experiments do not study the effect of the boundary condition but 
instead the effect variation of group size, punishments, and information has on individual 
contribution. Ledyard (1995) provides an overview of public goods experimental literature with 
known endpoints up to the mid 1990’s, starting with the influential early work undertaken in the 
area by Bohm (1972), where he set up a well thought out test “involving five different 
approaches to estimating demand for a public good.” His conclusion after the data were analyzed 
was that people may be willing to contribute to the public good even if it is not in their self-
interest. This experiment suggested the emergence of a social cohesion, which we attempted to 
capture in our intertemporal treatment. 
With several other works conducted by Robyn Dawes, John Orbell, and by their 
colleagues (Dawes 1980, Dawes et al., Orbell et al.), by Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames (1979), 
and by Mark Isaac and James Walker (1988), the findings in this time period suggested that 
A)There is more contribution than predicted in the Nash Equilibrium for one shot-versions of the 
public goods game, but also B) If the players interact repeatedly over a number of rounds, then 
contributions often start out higher than the Nash equilibrium and decline over time as more 
players choose to “free ride.” 
Public goods experiments with a known endpoint but otherwise similar parameters to our 
own experiment demonstrate this decline as well.  In Isaac et al (1998), Andreoni (1995b), and 
Croson (1996), experimental groups consisted of three or four people, as well as treatments 
consisting of ten or fifteen rounds. All three had treatments without punishments or other special 
parameters that would make comparison difficult. In all three, we find a free rider problem that 
leads to a decline in individual contribution. 
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Since Ledyard, public goods experiments explored the role of “conditional cooperation” 
Chaudhuri (2010) notes that much of the literature since 1995 has been concerned with 
establishing stable conditions to encourage cooperation. This was done with either punishments 
by monetary means (Fehr and Gachter 2000) or non-monetary means (Maschlet et al 2003). 
Methods to promote cooperation by allowing cooperation (Chaudhuri 2006) were also developed, 
and many of these methods were developed in the study of trust and prisoner’s dilemma games.  
Literature involving repeated public goods games with an unknown endpoint exist, but is 
sparse Cooperation or contribution to the public good can often be sustained under these 
conditions. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Friedman (1986), Raub (1988), and Taylor (1987) all 
demonstrate that if actors have an unknown time horizon and use a trigger strategy, then 
voluntary cooperation is possible. 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) was an early attempt to test whether a repeated public 
goods game resulted in higher individual contribution than a one-shot public goods game. Each 
game in the experimental treatment was repeated with a “random stopping rule,” and found that 
this treatment consistently resulted in higher returns than the one-shot public goods game (which 
was the control). None of the players knew any details regarding this rule, and so the game is a 
noteworthy example of an early public goods game with an unknown endpoint. 
 Sell and Wilson (1999) also ran a public goods experiment with an unknown endpoint. 
While the paper was concerned with the effect of group punishment, their treatments were 
divided into Required Grim and No Required Length. The Required Grim treatment forced the 
subjects into a grim trigger strategy (that is, once a player defects, all players must defect), and 
hence other players were punished for defecting. The No Required Length allowed the subjects 
to behave in any way they prefer, and subjects were merely informed of their choices. In this 
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treatment, conditions of the experiment were similar to ours, with contribution levels similar to 
our own. The results from this experiment will be compared to our results in Table 1.2. 
 In this treatment, subjects contributed on average 43 percent of their endowment to the 
public good. This is compared to 63 percent in the Required Grim treatment with the same 
discount rate. While a treatment with an unknown endpoint and punishment results in 
significantly larger contribution rates, a treatment with just an unknown endpoint results in 
approximately half of the average subjects’ endowment being contributed. 
Gonzalez et al (2004) conducted a public goods experiment with groups of three players. 
In any one period, each participant is endowed with 20 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), and 
must privately decide how much to contribute to a public good, keeping the remaining ECU for 
herself. The experiment’s control non-intertemporal treatments the standard protocol (SP), in 
which all three group members are publicly informed that the interaction will last for exactly 10 
periods.  In the interval protocol (PIP), each group member is aware that the interaction will last 
at least 8 rounds. In this game, Gonzalez et al found that when using the standard practice of 
publicly announcing a definite endpoint, participants tend to reduce the variation of cooperation 
levels across periods. 
While public goods games have used unknown endpoints, there are not public goods 
experiments with probabilistic endpoints. For this reason, we examine trust and prisoner 
dilemma games with probabilistic endpoints. J. Engle-Warnick and Robert L. Slonim (2006), for 
example, use a probabilistic endpoint in their trust game experiment.  
Their experiment consists of several “supergames” of forty sequentially repeated trust 
games divided in two parts. The first twenty games have indefinite length (i.e. an uncertain 
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number of rounds) and the last twenty have definite lengths (i.e. a number of rounds that is 
known with certainty). The first player then chooses between two actions: Send and Don't Send. . 
If they play Don't Send, the stage game ends and both players receive their endowment. If they 
play Send, their endowment doubles and is given to the second player. At this point in the stage 
game, the second player chooses between two actions: Return and Keep. If they play Return, the 
doubled endowment is split evenly between the players, and the stage game ends. If they play 
Keep, the second player receives the entire endowment. In the indefinitely repeated supergames, 
after each round there is a fixed probability that the game will end. When the supergame ends, 
subjects are randomly and anonymously re-paired with new opponents to play the next 
supergame. 
The experimenters noted the tit-for-tat strategy employed by most subjects in the 
experiment. The vast majority of first players in round 2 play Send when the second player in 
round 1 plays Return. Within each supergame, trust and reciprocity declines between the first 
and second player, and the number of times Send and Return is played declines. But in each new 
supergame, reciprocity resets to a higher level. Under a probabilistic endpoint, the length of a 
trust game also is shown to have an effect on reciprocity, and does not diminish with experience. 
Pedro Dal Bo conducted a similar experiment in "Cooperation under the shadow of the 
future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games," incorporating a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, where subjects interacted anonymously. In half the experiments, the session has 
a known endpoint, and the other half, the endpoint is probabilistically determined. The 
experimenter writes that, the greater the uncertainty (that is, the lower the probability that the 
session will be terminated), the greater the level of cooperation. Cooperation was determined by 
percentage of subjects choosing to Push and not Pull. Bo finds that the greater the uncertainty, 
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the greater the level of cooperation. Just as with Warnick and Slonin (2006), the tit for tat 
strategy leads to subjects to cooperate due to increasing levels of uncertainty. 
Tit-for-tat strategy is important in encouraging cooperation in trust games of indefinite 
length. This phenomenon allows, for instance, cooperation of randomized strangers to occur.  
“Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction” by Gabriele Camera 
and Marco Casari examined how random subjects could cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game, 
and the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers 
interacting indefinitely and lacking formal enforcement institutions. 160 subjects were recruited 
from the University of Purdue and sessions were run at the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Laboratory.  
The experiment has four treatments differing in two dimensions. The first was the level 
of information available to each subject. Under private monitoring, subjects observed only their 
own history and under public monitoring, they observed the history of the whole economy. The 
second dimension was the method of punishment. In some treatments subjects could only punish 
by defecting, while in the personal punishment treatment, they could pay a cost to inflict a loss 
on their opponent. The experimenters describe that the availability of information on actions in 
the economy was set at one of three different degrees. First, subjects could be aware only of their 
own history (private monitoring, private monitoring with punishment) or of the history of the 
entire economy. Second, the history of the economy could be made available at an aggregate 
(anonymous public monitoring) or individual level (non-anonymous public monitoring). 
Camera and Casari (2009) studied the qualitative impact of indefinite lengths, with a 
continuation probability, on cooperation among strangers in prisoner dilemma games. What is 
examined by Camera and Casari is that, under prisoner dilemma games of indefinite length, 
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cohesion emerges and the Nash equilibrium is higher. Even in anonymous settings, where 
players are unaware of what contribution other players make, cooperation can be sustained. 
Normann and Wallace observed to what extent is uncertainty about the game endpoint 
crucial to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in terms of experimental evidence in "The impact of the 
termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment." The game consisted of four 
treatments. In treatment Unknown, the length of the experiment (28 periods) was not mentioned 
to the participants and the instructions merely said that the experiment would last at least 22 
periods. In RandomLow, the instructions said that the experiment would last least 22 periods, 
and then the experiment would continue with a probability of 1/6. In treatment RandomHigh, 
there were at least 22 periods and then the experiment would continue with a probability of 5/6. 
In all four treatments, the matching of participants was fixed over the entire experiment. There 
were 15 pairs per treatment. 
The experiment demonstrated no significant difference in average cooperation rates 
among the four treatments. However, there is a significant and negative trend between number of 
rounds and cooperation in all rounds except Unknown. This indicated that the treatment 
Unknown was able to avoid what the experimenter referred to as the “end-game effect.” 
Experimental Design 
The experiment is a public goods game with a probabilistic endpoint and consists of two 
treatments, the non-intertemporal treatment and the intertemporal treatment. In the non-
intertemporal treatment, players make their decisions for all rounds during one meeting, while in 
the non-intertemporal treatment, which consisted of two waves of experimentation, subjects meet 
multiple times and each meeting consisted of one decision round, and otherwise consisted of the 
same experimental parameters.  In the non-intertemporal treatment, the sessions lasted 
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approximately twenty minutes and subjects attended a session once every Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday, and Friday. In the non-intertemporal treatment, 48 subjects were recruited and 
organized in groups of 4 from undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary in 
Williamsburg, Virginia. Each player was given five dollars which he can either keep, and earn 
one dollar, or invest in the group’s total investment, earning $.50, knowing that every other 
player will also earn $.50 for his investment and knowing that he will also earn $0.50 for each 
token invested by other people in the group. After the end of every round, a die is rolled for each 
group. If the die lands on 1,2,3,4, or 5, then the designated group continues for the next round. If 
the die lands on a 6, then the experiment is over for that group. Given the limited amount of 
money available for this experiment, it was sometimes necessary to increase the probability of 
the experiment ending for a given group from one-in-six to five-in-six, in order to end the 
experiment quickly. This was done due to the exceeding level of contribution exhibited by 
subjects in the non-intertemporal treatment. This was used at the end of Round 5 in both waves 
of the non-intertemporal treatment, and in two instances in the non-intertemporal treatment.
1
  
Because the public goods model includes risk (in the form of conditional cooperation) 
and uncertainty (in the form of others’ investment), subjects’ risk preferences may play a role in 
decision making. In our model, we measure risk preferences in two distinct ways. The first is 
through a lottery choice economics experiment designed by Holt and Laury (2002) with real 
monetary payoffs.  This lottery-based decision making exercise measures agent-specific risk 
tolerance, and is conducted at the beginning of the experiment. The second is through a series of 
survey questions framed around an agent’s reaction to various hypothetical scenarios and 
                                                          
1
 A total of 41 subjects, or 7.9% of all observations, were affected by this increase in the probability of termination 
Carlen 12 
 
frequency of participating in risk-oriented behavior such as wearing a seatbelt or gambling. A 
copy of the survey questions may be found in Appendix A.  
 Lottery Choice Risk Tolerance Game 
        In the Holt and Laury (2002) design, subjects make ten decisions between Options A and B. 
Each option comprises of two possible payoffs, with a probability assigned to each payoff. 
Option A is the “safer” choice because there is less variance between the two payoffs than in 
Option B. The payoffs assigned to each option are fixed but the probability of receiving a higher 
payoff in an option increases moving from decision number 1 to 10. In decision 1, the high 
payoff is selected if the number generated by the ten-digit random number generator is 1 and the 
low payoff is paid if the number generated is 2-10. In decision 2, the higher payoff is chosen if 
the number generated is 1 or 2 and the low payoff is chosen if the number generated is 3-10. By 
decision 10, the choice is between amounts of money that are fixed, either the high payoff or the 
low payoff. Because of this, we disregard subjects who choose B over A in decision 10, since 
they are choosing a low payoff over a high payoff, which suggested that they did not understand 
the game. A full copy of the experimental instructions may be found in Appendix B.  
The decision where subjects switch from the safe option to the risky option can be used to 
categorize their risk tolerance. Subject’s decisions in the experiment are used to define a range of 
values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). In the regression analysis, we use the 
mid-point of the range for the CRRA. Holt and Laury (2002) report ranges for a utility function 
of constant relative risk aversion in their paper. A value for the mid-CRRA that is less than zero 
indicate risk-seeking preferences, values that are greater than zero indicate risk aversion, and a 
mid-CRRA that is equal to zero indicates risk neutrality. Empirically, these designations conform 
closely with our intuitions regarding risk behavior. For instance, subjects that choose Option A in 
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the first four decisions are generally considered to be risk neutral. Subjects that choose Option A 
more than four times are generally risk averse, and a risk-seeking (or risk “loving”) subject will 
choose the safe option fewer than four times. 
               All subjects completed the risk preferences experiment at the beginning of the session. 
Once subjects completed all 10 decisions, one decision was randomly chosen for payment using 
a number generator. In the first treatment, subjects and were paid after completion of the public 
goods experiment and the final survey questions. 
 Survey 
               Subjects were asked to complete a survey with demographic and behavioral 
information, such as volunteering contribution. Some of this information was used in order to 
control for heterogeneity in our data. This included gender (1 represents male, 2 represents 
female), number of friends involved in the experiment, whether they volunteer for social or 
environmental causes, religious and political affiliation, and major (different numbers were 
associated with the various qualitative answers each individual gave). A selected number of 
relevant survey questions used in this study can be found in Appendix A.  
Theoretical Expectations 
 Theoretical expectations for an infinitely repeating public goods game were designed on 
the basis of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma model.  Not all public goods games have a 
boundary solution, but since our public goods game is modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma game, 
we will treat the other three as a monolithic unit that is either absolutely cooperating or defecting, 
then we can find the Nash equilibrium for the infinitely repeated public goods game by finding 
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the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma game with the same parameter. Hence, the 
prisoner’s dilemma game would be as follows: 
  
          
10,10 2.5, 12.5 
12.5, 2.5 5,5 
 
 Each player can only cooperate or invest in this model, and can only base his strategies 
on two alternatives: either all other players cooperate, or none of them do. In this model, there is 
a higher collective payoff brought about by all players cooperating, and therefore cooperating 
would be a more efficient strategy. However, defecting while the other players cooperate 
provides higher individual payoffs, and hence under conditions with a known endpoint, we can 
expect widespread defection. However, under the circumstances used in our treatments, each 
player could conform to one of two potential strategies. The first, the grim strategy, a player 
cooperates for as long as the other player (in this circumstance, players) cooperate, but as soon as 
the other player defects,  the first player begins to defect for the remainder of  the game. In the 
context of the public goods game, this means that if any of the three players defects, the first 
player takes notice of the free rider, and ceases cooperating. 
 The second strategy is referred to as the tit-for-tat strategy. In this circumstance, a player 
simply follows the strategy employed by the other player in the previous round. For simplicity, 
we can assume that all players follow the same strategy. For this reason, whether we assume that 
each player follows the tit-for-tat or grim strategy has little practical implication, since a tit-for-
Players 2, 3, and 4 
Cooperate 
Defect
 
Cooperate 
Defect 
Players 1 
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tat strategy is effectively also a grim strategy, and there are no differences in payoff outcomes. If 
each player is operating under the tit-for-tat strategy, then  one player defecting will lead to the 
others defecting, which results in the first player defecting in response, thus creating a feedback 
loop that appears to be identical to the grim strategy.  
The game continues to the next stage with probability 1-p and stops with probability p. 
Using the probability p, we can determine the payoff to which a given strategy converges to. The 
probability of the session continuing discounts the expected value of all future earnings, and 
hence we can theoretically represent the expected value convergence as: 
               
         
              
                       
Where   is the discount factor exhibited by each additional round, and   representing the 
payoff before expected value estimations and is constant across all periods. 
With five tokens, the strategy (Cooperate, Cooperate), which we shall refer to as the 
Reward (R), gives each player a payoff of 10. Since the probability of the experiment 
terminating in the given round is (5/6) The expected payoff for cooperating for all 
rounds converges to: 
R(1+   +    +     +    + ….+   )=R/(1-  )= 10/(1-(5/6))=59.998≈60 
The expected payoff for cooperating is now compared to the expected value of defecting 
on the value gained from one player cooperating and the rest defecting (represented as the 
Temptation, or T) compared to the result if everyone defects (represented as the Punishment, or 
P). The T value would be 12.5, while P would be 5. The expected payoff for defecting for all 
rounds converges to: 
 T+ P(1+   +    +     +    + ….+   )=T+P /1- =12.5+(5(5/6))/(1-(5/6))=37.49 
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Since the expected value of cooperating exceeds the expected value of defecting, the 
Nash equilibrium has the players cooperating indefinitely. It must be noted that in this theory, we 
assume all players use the grim trigger strategy. We assume that players either completely 
cooperate or completely defect, even though in the actual experiment, they would likely pursue a 
mixed strategy. However, the theory does hold even when players can use mixed strategies if we 
assume that the strategy to cooperate consists of any positive amount (1-5 tokens). 
After round five in the non-intertemporal treatment for both waves, as well as in two 
sessions in the non-intertemporal treatment, we raised the probability of the game ending from 
one-in-six to five-in-six. The probability of the session continuing fell from .83 (83%) to .167 
(16.7%), and therefore the Nash equilibrium changes. The expected payoff for cooperating for all 
rounds converges to: 
R(1+   +    +     +    + ….+   )=R/(1-  )= 10/(1-(1/6))=12 
The expected payoff for defecting for all rounds converges to: 
 T+ P(1+   +    +     +    + ….+   )=T+P /1- =12.5+(5(5/6))/(1-(5/6))=13.5 
 Hence, under these circumstances, the Nash equilibrium has the players defecting 
indefinitely. 
Results  
 During the experiment for the non-intertemporal treatment, we had experienced subjects 
not attending the experiment in later rounds. In order to maintain the groups that they had left, 
we had replaced their contributions with robot players, in order to continue the same incentives 
for the subjects still involved in the experiment. These robot players were calculated on the basis 
of the average contribution by the other players, and were removed from the data once analysis 
Carlen 17 
 
had begun, and therefore only the actual player contributions were examined in the econometric 
analysis. 
 At the same time, we made a few errors in the beginning of the first wave of the non-
intertemporal treatment, where we did not provide the subjects with information on group 
investment. This was due to my relative inexperience in the process of running the experiment, 
but as examined in the econometric analysis, the effect size of these errors (as a function of 
Treatment) were not significant enough to alter the contribution rates in a significant way.  
We’ve included a table of summary statistics that compare our experiment with 
experiments that contain at least one treatment that is analogous to our experiment in some way, 
such as including four subjects per group and where a token invested is worth roughly .5 of a 
token kept. We cannot reasonably conclude on the basis of these comparisons that our 
experimental design is superior or inferior with regard to reducing free riding,  but this provides 
a heuristic comparison nonetheless. Below we see that, compared to analogous experiments with 
known endpoints, we have relatively higher contribution rates. 
As shown in Appendix D, total group investment was consistently positive across all  
rounds for all sessions while the probability for experiment continuing was 5/6 (.833). There 
were no indications of a downward trend in the mean group investment, which we would expect 
to see in a public goods experiment with a predetermined endpoint. When part II of the 
experiment was conducted and the probability of the experiment continuing fell to 1/6 (.1667), 
there is a downward trend in mean group investment in Wave 2 as well as the session run by 
Professor Anderson’s Research Methods class (the probability change for part II occurred in 
Round 4 for waves 1 and 2, while for the Research Methods class, the change occurred in Round 
11 for Group 10, and in Round 12 for groups 1 and 3). 
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 Graphically, it would appear that the data supports our theoretical expectations that each 
subject would cooperate indefinitely as long as the probability for continuation was 5/6. When 
probability fell to 1/6, investment began to decline. However, econometric analysis will be 
necessary to determine the statistical significance of the relationship between contribution and 
the probability of continuation. The next section will also determine a statistically significant 
relationship between investment and any relevant variable, as well as a panel data and covariance 
analysis. In this section, it is important to explore how each variable affects the individual 
economic agent, and hence we will use individual investment as our dependent variable. 
 For both treatments, which together comprise seven sessions, we show a mean that is 
roughly half of each individual’s total endowment, which as demonstrated by the data in 
Appendix D, remains consistent across several rounds until the probability of continuation drops. 
The standard deviation of the experiment is also relatively high, considering the total number of 
tokens each player has.   
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
          # of Observations        Mean    95% Conf. Interval     Standard Deviation 
Carlen (2014)  590  2.285        [2.145, 2.420]    1.723 
 
   
 Below we compared the frequency of each token as a selected amount invested by each 
player under a high probability of continuation (P=5/6) and a low probability of continuation 
(P=1/6). Under high probability of continuation, the most common number of tokens invested 
per round by each player was two, followed by zero.  The next highest number was five. The 
distribution table below demonstrates skewness with regard to player’s decisions. While this 
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gives some justification for our theoretical assumption that individuals will choose to either 
cooperate or defect, the table below shows players engaging in mixed strategies.  
 Under a low probability of continuation, the frequency distribution shows an even 
stronger positive skew. Although the sample size is much smaller, we see that zero was selected 
as the number of tokens invested the most frequently. The next highest was two. While we see 
evidence of mixed strategies under these conditions, the distribution was more concentrated due 
to lower contribution rates. 
Table 2: Frequency of Token Selected 
Probability      0              1                  2     3     4  5  
P=5/6      107             76   127     80    57  97 
P=1/6      17              9    11     4  3  2 
 Below I compare the mean invested, as a percent of total endowment, to experiments 
with a known, unknown, and probabilistic endpoint. Since there are no other public goods 
experiments with a probabilistic endpoint, the experiments used for comparison are of the trust 
and prisoner’s dilemma game variety. The experiments selected were either similar to our 
experiment or had a treatment that was similar to our experiment. Experiments with punishments, 
variation in information disclosure, and public monitoring were not used. The number of 
observations depends on the number of decisions made by each subject. For instance, if one 
subject made three decisions in three rounds, that would be three observations. It is difficult to 
make strong claims from these tables, as the experiments still vary from ours, especially the trust 
and prisoner’s dilemma games. However, the tables below provide a rough indication of our 
relative success in increasing cooperation in public goods games. 
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 Table 3.1: Data comparison against experiments with a known endpoint 
   # of Observations  Invested (%)  Mean    95% Conf. Interval 
Carlen (2014)  590   45.6  2.285         [2.145, 2.420] 
Isaac et al (1998)* 220   29.1       ***  *** 
Andreoni (1995b)* 400   44.1  ***  *** 
Croson (1996)*  240   11.77  ***  *** 
 * Summary found in review by Zelmer 2003. 
 
This supports our initial expectations that a probabilistic endpoint would result in higher 
contribution rates, with the exception of Andreoni (1995b). As explained in the literature review, 
cooperation levels declined in all three experiments as the session progressed across rounds. In 
our experiment, we experienced no such drawback until the probability for the continuation of 
the experiment dropped. Not only were subjects contributing significant percentages of their 
endowment, they were able to maintain that for the entirety of the experiment where the 
probability of continuation was 5/6. 
 
Table 3.2: Data comparison against experiments with an unknown endpoint 
   # of Observations         Invested (%) Mean  95% Conf. Interval 
Carlen (2014)  590   45.6  2.285  [2.145, 2.420]   
González et al (2004) 1080   44.24  ***         *** 
Sell and Wilson (1999) 320    43.0  ***         ***   
Palfrey et al (1994)  630    46.3  ***         ***   
 
In experiments with an unknown endpoint, we find that our experiment has roughly 
comparable results. Again, this provides no significant verification of our results, but it is 
important to note that the mean contribution rates in our experiment are significantly above zero. 
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Table 3.3: Data comparison against experiments with a probabilistic endpoint 
   # of Observations         Invested (%) Mean  95% Conf. Interval 
Carlen (2014)  590   45.6  2.285  [2.145, 2.420]   
Warnick et al (2004) 290   63.2  ***         *** 
Pedro Dal Bo (2005) 975    30.0  ***         ***   
Normann et al (2011)  455    59.1  ***         ***   
 
For the probabilistic endpoint, cooperation seems comparable, and two of the three 
experiments demonstrated higher proportion invested than ours. However, the experiments in 
Normann et al (2011) and Pedro Dal Bo (2005) are prisoner’s dilemma games, while Warnick et 
al (2004) is a trust game. These games are significantly different, in the sense that each game did 
not permit the opportunity of mixed strategies. Either players cooperated, or they defected. If the 
strategies involved some cooperation and some defection, the experimental design would be 
more similar. 
Summary statistics indicate that the mean individual investment is 2.285, with a standard 
error of .07 and a standard deviation of 1.723. Using a covariance analysis, we construct a 
correlation matrix and find a positive correlation between group contribution and individual 
investment. This would appear logical, since this means that as other subjects in the group shirk 
and reduce their contribution, individual investment also declines as others react to the declining 
investment. However, we find a negative correlation between individual earnings. This will be 
explored along with the panel data analysis. A smaller, but positive correlation exists between 
continued probability and individual investment. 
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Econometric Analysis  
 In the following analysis, it was necessary to include a “lag” in the data for group 
investment and individual earnings. Each subject must first make their decision before they have 
this information for the given round, the decisions are made on the basis of the previous round. 
Hence, our data file lists the total group contribution and individual earnings for round 1 along 
with round 2. In our panel data analysis, this allows us to indicate if there is an effect these 
variables have on individual investment, and how large that effect would be. For this analysis, 
we measured the significance of the relationship and the effect size between individual 
investment and mid-CRRA, group contribution, individual earnings, and probability, as well as 
several demographic characteristics. 
Table 2 on the next page presents the standard errors estimated from the fixed effects and 
random effects models. Model 1 is a fixed effects model that does not control for demographic 
characteristics or risk aversion. Model 2 is a random effects model, and also does not include 
controls for demographic characteristics. Model 3 is a random effects model and does include 
controls for demographic characteristics. Before making their decision in a given round, subjects 
are given information on how much they earned and how much other players invested in the 
previous round. Hence, earnings and group investment are lagged so as to accurately measure the 
effect size. 
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Table 4: Panel Data Analysis 
    Model 1   Model 2                 Model 3  
 
Risk Aversion      .0555   .0195 
       (.1314)   (.1351) 
 
Earnings   -.0342   -.6162**  -.6239** 
    (.0856)   (.0583)   (.0591) 
 
Group Investment  .0693   .3398**   .3414** 
    (.0463)   (.0295)   (.0300) 
 
Probability   .7094*   .8211**   .7956** 
    (.3961)   (.3494)   (.3493) 
 
Gender          -.1089 
          (.1249) 
 
Number of Friends        .0216 
          (.0443) 
 
Major          .0157 
          (.0442) 
 
Religious affiliation        -.0459 
          (.0390) 
 
Environmental affiliation        -.1137 
          (.0839) 
 
Social affiliation         .0222 
          (.1129) 
 
Political affiliation        -.0032 
          (.0710) 
 
Session Controls    No  Yes   Yes 
 
 
F-Statistic    2.27  5.77   7.01 
 
R-Squared    .1913  .4667   .4701 
 
N     590  590   590 
* Indicates a p-value of less than .1 but greater than or equal to .05 
**Indicates a p-value of less than .05 
 
In this model, Models 2 and 3 are controlled for session variation. There were seven 
dummy variables for the seven sessions, with the last one being dropped. The first five sessions 
were run by Professor Anderson’s Research Methods class, while the sixth and seventh sessions 
were waves 1 and 2 of the intertemporal treatment. 
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We must also decide whether a fixed effects or random effects model is preferable for 
measuring the effect size of a given variable. The fixed effects model is appropriate when 
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with independent variables. That is, if covariates are 
uncorrelated with the errors, then the random effects model is unbiased and approximately equal 
to the fixed effects estimator up to sampling error. The random effects model is appropriate when 
unobserved heterogeneity isn’t correlated with independent variables. 
The way of choosing between a fixed and random effects model is by running a Hausman 
test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent 
model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results. The Hausman test 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator and the 
coefficients estimated by the fixed effects estimator are the same. If they are, then it is acceptable 
to use random effects. If we get a significant P-value, however, we will use fixed effects. 
Because risk aversion is time invariant for all subjects, it must be dropped from the fixed 
effects model. Demographic characterisitics are also time invariant, and hence are also dropped. 
This is also expected for all independent variables in our experiment since the effect these have 
on individual investment varies from person to person. Based on the results from the Hausman 
test, unobserved heterogeneity cannot be expected to be correlated with independent variables. 
Therefore, we will use a random effects model for all variables. Details regarding the panel data 
analysis, both the variable identification and indication of the meaning of the variable names, are 
included in Appendix E. 
For group investment, earnings, and continued probability, we rejected the null 
hypothesis, and hence can conclude that a statistically significant relationship exists between 
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these variables and individual investment in models 2 and 3. Even when taking into account 
demographic characteristics, the null was still rejected. Demographics such as gender and 
affiliation with environmental or social organizations do not have significant effect on individual 
investment.  However, the demographic variables affected the coefficients and standard errors of 
continued probability, individual earnings, and group contribution, as evidenced from the move 
between models 2 and 3.  
It is surprising that the session was not found to have a significant effect on individual 
contribution. Our experiment involved an intertemporal and nonintertemporal public goods game, 
which did not vary individual investment as we had expected.  What is not surprising is that 
continued probability did have a significant effect on individual investment, which was predicted 
by our theory. We can conclude that the sudden decline in our graphs that occurred when the 
probability of continuation fell sharply was largely driven by this probability change. 
It is important to note, however, that earnings and total group investment also drove 
individual investment. This indicates that the players are significantly aware of the free rider 
phenomenon, and are engaged in a trigger strategy of a kind. Along with probability of 
continuation, individuals are largely driven by conditional cooperation. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 We see that our experiment demonstrates higher mean investment proportional to one’s 
endowment than the surveyed experiments with a known endpoint, while results our comparable 
to those experiments surveyed with an unknown and probabilistic endpoints.  Our data graphs 
demonstrated that, unlike comparative experiments with known endpoints in Table 3.1, our 
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experiments did not result in a decline in investment until after the probability of continuation 
was dropped. 
While evidence of mixed strategies exists, players often selected amounts closer to zero 
and five when investing. This gives some support to our theoretical approach, which assumed 
that individuals would either cooperate or defect. However, a more constructive theory will have 
included the possibility of mixed strategies. 
In our Panel Data Analysis, we used random effects models, considering the fact that in 
experimental settings, the effect that any of these factors have on individual investment varies 
from individual to individual. Nevertheless, each of these variables has a statistically significant 
effect on individual contribution. We failed to reject the null hypothesis for all variables except 
for total group contribution, earnings, and the probability of continuation. This indicates that 
there was not a significant effect size resulting from session or demographic variation, and that 
risk aversion similarly represents an insignificant effect size. The data suggests that the variation 
between one round per session and multiple rounds in one session does not result in a statistically 
significant change in contribution rates. 
We rejected the null hypothesis for group mean investment, probability of continuation, 
and individual earnings, indicating that these factors drive a large part of the individual 
investment. On the one hand, the probability of continuation declining drives the sudden decline 
in individual investment seen at the end of several sessions. On the other, players are engaged in 
conditional cooperation, which involves a trigger strategy that depends on earnings and group 
investment.   
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Our experiment verified that probabilistic endpoints have a positive effect to cooperation 
in public goods games as they do in prisoner dilemma experiments. We do find that our 
experiment has consistently positive contribution rates. We find that a high probability of 
continuation has a positive impact on individual investment, along with lagged group investment 
and individual earnings. 
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Appendix A:  Selected Survey Questions 
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What is your gender?  
Male 
Female 
 
Which political party best represents your interests?  
Democratic 
Republican 
Libertarian 
Green 
Other 
What best describes your religious affiliation?  
None 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Jewish 
Muslim 
Other religion 
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How many people participating in this experiment do you consider to be your friend?   
 
During the past two years have you been a member, contributed time, or contributed 
money to a social organization (for example soup kitchens or Big Brother, Big Sisters) 
    a. Yes 
    b. No 
 
During the past two years have you been a member, contributed time, or contributed 
money to an environmental organization (for example, a campus environmental group or 
the Nature Conservancy) 
    a. Yes 
    b. No 
 
What is your primary academic interest area/major area? 
    a.  Area I (Sciences) 
    b.  Area II (Social Sciences) 
    c.  Area III (Arts and Humanities 
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Appendix B: Lottery Choice Game 
You will be making choices between two lotteries, such as those represented as "Option 
A" and "Option B" below. The money prizes are determined by the computer equivalent of 
throwing a ten-sided die. Each outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is equally likely. If you 
choose Option A in the row shown below, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of earning $6.00 and a 
9 in 10 chance of earning $4.80. Similarly, Option B offers a 1 in 10 chance of earning $11.55 
and a 9 in 10 chance of earning $0.30.  
Decision             Option A 
 
 Option B Your Choice 
 
1st 
. 
. 
$6.00 if the die is 1 
$4.80 if the die is 2 - 10  
$11.55 if the die is 1 
$0.30 if the die is 2 - 10 
     A or B 
     
Each row of the decision table contains a pair of choices between Option A and Option 
B. You make your choice by clicking on the "A" or "B" buttons on the right. Only one option in 
each row can be selected, and you may change your decision as you wish. Note: Note, try 
clicking on one of the radio buttons, then change by clicking on the other one. 
 
Decision Option A 
 
  Option B Your Choice  
 
1st 
. 
. 
$6.00 if the die is 1 
$4.80 if the die is 2 - 10  
$11.55 if the die is 1 
$0.30 if the die is 2 - 10 
      A or B 
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up being used. The 
selection of the one to be used depends on the "throw of the die" that is the determined by the 
computer's random number generator. No decision is any more likely to be used than any other, 
and you will not know in advance which one will be selected, so please think about each one 
carefully. This random selection of a decision fixes the row (i.e. the Decision) that will be used. 
For example, suppose that you make all ten decisions and the throw of the die is 9, then 
your choice, A or B, for decision 9 below would be used and the other decisions would not be 
used. 
 
After the random die throw fixes the Decision row that will be used, we need to obtain a 
second random number that determines the earnings for the Option you chose for that row. In 
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Decision 9 below, for example, a throw of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 will result in the higher 
payoff for the option you chose, and a throw of 10 will result in the lower payoff.  
Decision Option A 
 
Option B Your Choice 
 
9th 
$6.00 if the die is 1 - 9 
 $4.80 if the die is 10  
$11.55 if the die is 1 - 9 
$0.30 if the die is 10 
        A or B 
   10th $6.00 if the die is 1 -10 
 
$11.55 if the die is 1 - 10         A or B 
For decision 10, the random die throw will not be needed, since the choice is between 
amounts of money that are fixed: $6.00 for Option A and $11.55 for Option B. 
 Making Ten Decisions: After you finish these instructions, you will see a table with 10 
decisions in 10 separate rows, and you choose by clicking on the buttons on the right, option A 
or option B, for each of the 10 rows. You may make these choices in any order and change them 
as much as you wish until you press the Submit button at the bottom. 
The Relevant Decision: One of the rows is then selected at random, and the Option (A 
or B) that you chose in that row will be used to determine your earnings. Note: Please think 
about each decision carefully, since each row is equally likely to end up being the one that is 
used to determine payoffs. 
Determining the Payoff: After one of the decisions has been randomly selected, the 
computer will generate another random number that corresponds to the throw of a ten sided die. 
The number is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, ... 10. This random number determines your earnings 
for the Option (A or B) that you previously selected for the decision being used. 
Instructions Summary 
To summarize, you will indicate an option, A or B, for each of the rows by 
clicking on the "radio buttons" on the right side of the table. 
Then a random number fixes which row of the table (i.e. which decision) is 
relevant for your earnings. 
In that row, your decision fixed the choice for that row, Option A or Option B, 
and a final random number will determine the money payoff for the decision you made. 
Payoffs will be made in cash. 
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DECISION PAYOFF STRUCTURE 
  
Decision  
         
         Option A  
 
Option B  
      Your  Decision  
        Circle One 
1  $6.00 if the  die is 1  
$4.80 if the die is 2-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1  
$0.30 if the die is 2-10  
A or B  
2  $6.00 if the die is 1 -2 
$4.80 if the die is 3-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-2  
$0.30 if the die is 3-10  
A or B  
3  $6.00 if the die is 1-3  
$4.80 if the die is 4-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-3  
$0.30 if the die is 4-10  
A or B  
4  $6.00 if the die is 1-4  
$4.80 if the die is 5-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-4  
$0.30 if the die is 5-10  
A or B  
5  $6.00 if the die is 1-5  
$4.80 if the die is 6-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-5  
$0.30 if the die is 6-10  
A or B  
6  $6.00 if the die is 1-6  
$4.80 if the die is 7-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-6  
$0.30 if the die is 7-10  
A or B  
7  $6.00 if the die is 1-7  
$4.80 if the die is 8-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-7  
$0.30 if the die is 8-10  
A or B  
8  $6.00 if the die is 1-8  
$4.80 if the die is 9-10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-8  
$0.30 if the die is 9-10  
A or B  
9   $6.00 if the die is 1-9  
$4.80 if the die is 10  
$11.55 if the die is 1-9  
$0.30 if the die is 10  
A or B  
10  $6.00 if the die is 1-10  $11.55 if the die is 1-10  A or B  
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Appendix C: Repeated Public Goods Experiment Instructions and Relevant Forms 
 Instructions 
 
Matchings: The experiment consists of a series of rounds. You have been randomly 
assigned to a group with a total of 4 people – you and 3 other people. In each round, you will be 
matched with the same group of 3 other people. The decisions that you and the other 3 people 
make will determine the amounts earned by each of you. The identities of the other people in 
your group will never be revealed to you. 
Investments: You begin each round with a number of "tokens," which may either be 
kept or invested. The 3 people you are matched with will decide how many of their tokens to 
keep, and how many to invest. You will not be able to see the others' decisions until after your 
decision is submitted.  
Earnings: The payoff to you will equal:     
$1.00 for each token you keep,  
$0.50 for each token you invest, and  
$0.50 for each token invested by the 3 other people who you are matched with. 
Subsequent Matchings: You will be in the same group of 4 participants in all 
subsequent rounds, so the 3 other people you are matched with in one round are the same people 
that you are matched with in the next round. 
 
Examples: Suppose you have only two tokens for the round, and the earnings from 
tokens kept, invested, and invested by the others are $1.00, $0.50, and $0.50 respectively.  
 If you keep both tokens, then your earnings will be: $1.00 x 2 = $2.00 from the tokens 
kept, plus $0.50 times the number of tokens invested by the other people in your group.  
 If you invest both tokens, then your earnings will be: $0.50 x 2 = $1.00 from the tokens 
invested, plus $0.50 times the number of tokens invested by the other people in your 
group.  
 If you keep one and invest one, then your earnings will be: 
$1.00 x 1 = $1.00 from the token kept, plus  
$0.50 x 1 = $0.50 for the token invested, plus  
$0.50 times the number of tokens invested by the other people in your group.  
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Note: In each of the 3 above cases, what you earn from the others' investments is: $0.00 
if the others invest 0 tokens, $0.50 if the other people invest 1 token (in total) and keep the rest, 
$1.00 if the other people invest 2 tokens (in total), etc. 
 
You begin each round with an endowment of 5 tokens, each of which can either be kept 
or invested. The 3 other people in your group will also have 5 tokens. 
Everybody earns money in the same manner: $1.00 for each token kept, $0.50 for each 
token invested, and $0.50 for each token invested by the 3 other people. 
Once all investment decisions are recorded for a round, we will collect your decision 
sheet. Before your next meeting on Wednesday, we will calculate the total amounts invested in 
each group of 4 people and fill in the total amount invested and your earnings information for the 
round at the bottom of your decision sheet.  We will return your decision sheet and your cash 
earnings to you next Wednesday.   
At the end of the session today, we will throw a 6-sided die to determine whether or not 
there will be another round of decision making on Wednesday. If the throw of the 6-sided die is 
1, the experiment will end. If the throw of the 6-sided is 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, a new decision making 
round will begin. We will make a separate die throw for each of the 15 groups of 4 people who 
are participating.  To protect the anonymity of the people in your group, no one will be told their 
group number. Thus, you will not know whether or not your will make a round 2 decision until 
we meet on Wednesday.  If one of the die throws determines that your group will not make 
another round of decisions, this information will be included in your packet on Wednesday.   
At the start of each new round, you will be given a new endowment of 5 tokens. You are 
free to change the numbers of tokens kept and invested from round to round. 
Anonymity: As noted above, the identities of the specific members of your group will 
never be revealed to you. In addition, you should not reveal your ID number or any information 
about this experiment to anyone else at the College. You will have an opportunity to ask the 
researchers questions about the study at the end of the semester. 
Instructions Summary 
 You will be matched with the same group of 3 other people in each round.  
 All people will begin with 5 tokens which they may keep (and earn $1.00 each) or invest 
(and earn $0.50 each), knowing that they will also earn $0.50 for each token invested by 
other people in the group. 
 You will begin each round with a new endowment of 5 tokens, irrespective of how many 
tokens you may have kept or invested in previous rounds. 
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 At the end of each round we will throw a 6-sided die to determine whether or not there 
will be another decision making round. If the throw of the die is 1, the experiment will 
end.  Otherwise, there will be another decision making round.  
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Part II Instructions 
 Starting at the end of this round and at the end of every subsequent round, we will throw 
a 6-sided die to determine whether or not there will be another decision making round. If 
the throw of the die is 1,2,3,4, or 5 the experiment will end. Otherwise, if the throw of the 
die is 6, there will be another decision making round. 
 All other features of the experiment will remain the same. 
 You will be matched with the same group of 3 other people that you have been matched 
with since Round 1, and your group will remain the same for all additional rounds. 
 All people will begin with 5 tokens which they may keep (and earn $1.00 each) or invest 
(and earn $0.50 each), knowing that they will also earn $0.50 for each token invested by 
other people in the group. 
 You will begin each round with a new endowment of 5 tokens, irrespective of how many 
tokens you may have kept or invested in previous rounds. 
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Decision Sheet        Your ID________ 
Round _______ 
Your token endowment this round = 5. 
Please fill in the 2 blanks highlighted in yellow below: 
Tokens Invested by You this Round  = _________ 
Tokens Kept by You this Round  = _________ 
Note:  Sum of the 2 amounts must = ____5_____ 
 
We will fill in information below this line at the end of the round. 
Total Invested by all 4 People in Your Group this Round  = __________ 
Your Total Earnings this Round    = $_________ (record this amount 
on your receipt form) 
Based on the die throw for your group at the end of last round you will (will not) play another 
round today  
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ID Number 
 
This packet contains a card with the ID number that will be used to link your decisions 
throughout the semester. To protect the anonymity of your decisions, this ID number will not be 
linked to your name.  Thus, we will not be able to retrieve your ID number if you lose this card.  
It is very important that you keep the ID card in a safe place and bring it with you to every 
decision making session.  You must show your ID card in order to be paid earnings from the 
experiment.  You make take a picture of the ID card with your phone and show the picture to us 
to claim your earnings.  If you lose your ID card and you do not have a picture of it, you forfeit 
any unclaimed earnings and your participation in the experiment will be terminated. 
You may not give the ID card to anyone else to claim earnings or make decisions for you.  
You are on your honor as a student at the College of William and Mary that the ID card will only 
be used by you. 
 
Please sign below that you have received a copy of this information regarding the ID card 
and that you agree to the conditions of use described above. 
 
_______________________________________________  ________________  
                                            Sign                  Date 
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Appendix D: Total Group Investment across time, organized by session 
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Appendix E: Panel Data Analysis Variables 
Variables Identification Notes 
Round Panel Variable 
ID Time Variable 
Individual Investment Independent Variable 
Total Group Investment Dependent Variable Group Investment 
Risk Aversion Dependent Variable                     Mid-CRRA Measurment 
Session Dependent Variable 
Gender Dependent Variable 
Earnings Dependent Variable Individual earnings 
Probability Dependent Variable Probability of continuation 
  Major      Dependent Variable 
  
  Political affiliation    Dependent Variable 
  
  Religious affiliation    Dependent Variable 
 
  Environmental affiliation    Dependent Variable Whether volunteered for environmental group 
 
  Social affiliation    Dependent Variable Whether volunteered for social group 
 
  Number of Friends     Dependent Variable 
   
